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ABSTRACT
That financial matters did not constrain industrial takeoff in the UK is
generally accepted in the historical literature; in contrast, contemporary
empirical analyses have found evidence that financial development can be a
causal determinant of economic growth. We look to reconcile these findings by
concentrating on a particular aspect of industrialising UK where inefficiencies
in finance could have had bite: The finance of physical infrastructures. We
document the historical record and develop the importance of spatial
disaggregation and spillovers in both technological and financial development.
We develop a simple model that captures the nature of infrastructure finance
within a theory of endogenous growth where financial costs are endogenous.
We argue that the conception of the finance-growth nexus as a largely static,
aggregative phenomenon misses out a good deal of complexity and we relate
that complexity to a number of implications for regulation of both financial
systems and the emergence of infrastructures.
JEL Classification: O11, O16, O40, N23
Keywords: Finance and growth, economic history, infrastructure, economic
integration.
1 Introduction
The sustained period of high economic growth in the UK from the mid-eighteenth
century was accompanied by a massive increase in the supply of physical transport
infrastructure, from turnpikes to waterways to railroads. While innovation in in-
dustrial technologies was critical in expanding production possibilities, the supply
of such infrastructure defined the scope of markets by determining the cost of ob-
taining raw goods and of shipping products to market. We know a good deal about
the impact of infrastructure on industrial development, but we know less about
the financial underpinnings of that expansion of infrastructure and the affect of
that finance on wider economic and financial development. The development of in-
frastructure in the UK, particularly the financing arrangements that supported its
projection, and the connection of this to wider economic and financial development
is the focus of this paper.
In addition, the interdependence between infrastructural finance and the ex-
pansion of industrial output means that we can, to a limited extent, draw parallels
with the more general contemporary literature on the nexus between finance and
growth. In order to demonstrate this link further, we develop a theory that captures
the nature of infrastructural finance we uncover in the context of simple model of
finance and growth.
In Section 2, we look to understand the historical perspective that finance was
not a constraint on industrial takeoff in the UK; that is, the central financial markets
or large and efficient banks we see today are not thought to have been a causal factor
in explaining the occurrence of industrial revolution. We document the nature of
infrastructure finance and show that it too did not rely on central money markets
in its early stages. Instead, formal coalitions of local investors were formed in
order to finance the construction, moving toward the use of centralized financial
systems as the economy developed. We also consider the existence of spillovers
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from these early coalitions onto the efficiency of wider financial intermediation. The
importance of such spillovers to the later emergence of sophisticated, centralised
financial structures suggests a new channel for understanding the potential for
financial matters to determine growth.
In Section 3 we develop a simple theory of finance and endogenous growth that
can account for some of the dynamic, disaggregated elements found in our historical
analysis. The theory captures low-growth equilibria and sheds light on the impli-
cations of accounting for such disaggregation in models of finance and growth. In
particular, we find that encouraging the emergence of a national financial system
can have negative consequences for growth. In Section 4 we consider the contempo-
rary finance and growth literature in the light of the historical evidence, and argue
that the factors identified in the UK case are relevant to, but omitted from, our
current understanding of the finance-growth nexus. Section 5 concludes the paper
with a summary of our main findings.
The general reader might wonder what all this has to do with modern economies
that are integrated with global financial systems and in which large infrastructure
projects are managed and financed through sophisticated public-private partner-
ships. The present extent of international capital flows can mask a detachment
from financial services of large parts of an emerging nation’s population. Beck and
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt (2008) summarizes the recent research agenda that addresses the
lack of access to finance by many in poor countries. The historical episode and the
theory presented in this paper emphasises the importance of local information in
identifying emerging hotspots of economic activity before they are more widely seen
at the aggregate level. The lack of access to finance noted in Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt has relevance for the ability of local investors today to take advantage of
their informational advantages in the way that investors did during the industrial
revolution in England. Those informational advantages could also mean that, in
emerging economies, the decentralised development of an infrastructure more sen-
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sitive to differences in local demand might be preferable to the grand ambitions
of state-sponsored infrastructure networks intended to integrate an otherwise ge-
ographically separated national economy.1 The historical evidence presented here
raises questions that are potentially highly relevant to the modern context.
2 The Industrial Revolution and Finance
The historical consensus is that finance did not constrain the industrial growth of
the UK. Subsection 2.1 goes through historical evidence on the role of finance in
entrepreneurship and industry. Subsection 2.2 introduces evidence on the financial
arrangements that emerged to fund physical infrastructure projects through the
industrial revolution. Subsection 2.3 begins to draw-out some of the findings from
our historical analysis.
2.1 Industrial Finance
Among the major financial innovations of the industrial revolution in Britain was
the expansion of access to the incorporation of limited liability joint-stock company
in the middle of the nineteenth century.2 Robinson (1952) puts this invention on
a par with that of the steam-engine. The belated emergence of widely used joint-
stock finance was mirrored by the relatively late growth of formal stock markets
that grew out of the early capital markets described in Neal (1990).
This apparent delay in the development of more specialized financial services did
not, however, prevent the emergence over the course of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century of alternative methods of industrial finance. Cottrell (1980)
1Consider China’s current investment in infrastructure to connect remote parts of that country
or the capital expenditure on the Trans-Amazon Highway in the 1970s. Smith (1990) argues that
a centralised approach in France retarded that country’s industrial takeoff.
2Specifically, the Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1844 and 1856, and the Limited Liability Act
of 1855, greatly expanded the access to the establishment of a limited liability joint stock company
and formalized the procedure of incorporation via a Registrar of Companies.
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argues that it is generally accepted that savings were adequate to support industri-
alization and that the most commonly cited institutional impediments to finance,
the Usury Act of 1660 and the Bubble Act of 1720, constituted no real barrier
to industrialization.3 Hudson (2002) reiterates this: Internal self-finance was the
dominant facilitator of industrial expansion. Prominent macroeconomic histories of
the industrial revolution, such as Landes (1969) and Mokyr (1990), barely consider
that institutional constraints on finance might have caused differences in industrial
take-off. Neal (1994) details the growing connections between financial innovations
and industrial development, but our question is one of causality. Financial develop-
ment was most surely a necessary component of industrial takeoff, but not clearly
a sufficient one.
The general argument runs that an individual entrepreneur, especially a good
one, could find the start-up capital required or use reinvested profits to expand
as and when conditions allowed. Further demands for finance were met by the
growth in the number of country banks (often set up by industrialists) and, later,
by the gradual take-up of joint-stock banking and the growth of a central stock
market into the nineteenth century. The late emergence of banking and stock
markets described in Neal (1994), in this view, reflected not the release of some
legislative or institutional constraint but an acceleration of demand for them along
the pecking order of finance. The absence of bank finance, of central stock markets,
and of accessible joint-stock operations was not a direct impediment to industrial
takeoff. As Robinson (1952, p.86) put it, “where enterprise leads, finance follows.”
This argument runs against the large body of empirical evidence, surveyed in
Levine (2005), that suggests that financial development is strongly correlated with,
and perhaps leads, the level of economic growth. As we describe in Section 4, part
of reconciling these findings is in recognising we do not have a good understanding
3The former Act restricted the rate of interest that could be charged on bills and advances; the
latter necessitated that consent to establish joint stock companies must come from Parliament.
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of precisely where constraints of finance might bind. In order to see this, we need
to make a distinction between the types of activity requiring finance.
Problems in raising finance for investment largely occur where there is a signif-
icant element of fixed costs. As Pollard (1964) argued, most investments in early
industry could be small – at least contained within the easy reach of an individual
firm’s finances – so the industry-leads-finance story is perhaps not so surprising.4
Physical transport infrastructures are a class of investments characterized by large
fixed costs and are strongly correlated with industrial development.5 Physical in-
frastructures needed some forms of financial organization in order to emerge, there-
fore. Section 2.2 goes through evidence on the nature of infrastructural finance
through the period of industrial revolution in the UK.
2.2 Finance, Industrial Growth and Infrastructure in the
UK
The production of significant pieces of infrastructure required a greater financial
outlay than was feasible for most firms alone. As such, in the absence of public
investments, the emergence of financial intermediation of some form – through in-
formal coalitions of firms, bank finance, or the creation of joint stock companies –
was thus inevitable. Such intermediation was, of course, itself not costless: Map-
ping the path of infrastructure required coordination among firms; legal specialists
needed to be hired in order to obtain Parliamentary assent; potential wider in-
vestors needed to be sought out; banks needed to be negotiated with; and so on.
On top of this, at the onset of the industrial revolution many new infrastructural
technologies had yet to be proven and the industrial centers had yet to emerge. The
costs of relaying information about the virtues of any given project, especially dur-
4Even what we might think of to be a large fixed cost in manufacturing, the factory premises
constructed to house workers and machines, were often rented in arrears from more wealthy
individuals, with multiple tenancy, subletting and power-sharing prevalent (see Hudson, 2002).
5See Hulten (1996), Caldero´n and Serve´n (2004), Keller and Shiue (2008) and Atack et al.
(2008).
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ing times of speculation, were crucial determinants of the intermediary structures
that resulted.
For reference, Figure 1 depicts the phases of each of the main forms of trans-
port infrastructure in the UK next to data for the per capita volume of industrial
production, using the data in Bairoch (1982).
Figure 1: Per Capita Industrial Production and UK Infrastructure, 1750–1980
The industrial revolution saw a gradual standardization of the way in which
infrastructure finance was regulated through Parliament. The Bubble Act of 1720
necessitated that joint-stock companies be authorized by royal charter. Thus, the
construction of any piece of infrastructure required a Bill to be passed in Parliament.
Further, from 1794, requirements for an infrastructure Bill included the need to
deposit a map of landholdings in the vicinity of the project, reference books (linked
to the map of landholdings) of landowners and occupiers as well as their support
or opposition to the plan, and a list of proposed financial supporters. Most of
the evidence cited in this Section is based on analysis of these deposits. We can
interpret these data with confidence, therefore.
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2.2.1 The Emergence of Turnpikes in the UK
A surprising amount is know about the turnpikes of the mid-eighteenth century.
Buchanan (1986, p.227) notes that most turnpike companies “were run by men
representative of the economic life of the area.” Regional capital markets funneled
some investments and investors were large in number and from a wide range of
social strata. Bogart (2006) finds that turnpike trusts were typically spatially con-
centrated in the vicinity of major economic centers. Regional and network effects
in the diffusion of turnpikes were significant.
2.2.2 Financing the UK Canal Network
The development of the UK’s waterway network during the late eighteenth century
was achieved without the use of central money markets. Ward (1974) describes the
typical process of projecting a canal: A group of industrial and merchant leaders
would see the potential benefit to their business of installing a canal in their vicinity.
The promoters would either call upon a financier, or become financiers themselves,
to sell scrip and shares in a prospective joint-stock canal company. The canals were
mostly financed by those local to the route of the canal. Those who invested were
by no means uniformly wealthy. Ward classifies investors by occupation and social
status, and documents that the majority of investments came from local landowners,
merchants, tradesmen, manufacturers and professionals – people whose wealth was
not only relatively limited but also mostly tied up in their primary employment.
This pattern is seen across the country and throughout the century. Ward notes,
however, that through the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, centralized
stock markets became more willing to support canal projects. Turnbull (1987)
finds not only this pattern of local finance of canals but also a localized pattern
in the construction of canals. The importance of an integrated, national system of
waterways gave way to local and regional demands for routes unconnected to trunk
lines. Canals were built as local enterprizes first, and formed part of a national
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network only later.
2.2.3 The Finance of Railways in the UK
We have the most data about the financial development of the UK railway system.
Mitchell (1964) documents the scale of investment: Capital expenditure on railways
peaked at over 6% of national income in the 1840s before falling off after then. Hunt
(1935) first showed that the early railways were, like the canal system, established
without the use of the London stock exchange. Again, the provincial nature of
finance is also clear.6
We can draw upon some specific evidence from late industrial Lancashire in Shea
(2007), a new dataset of corporate finance history; in particular the capital history
of the Wigan Branch Railway. There was nothing special about this railway, it was
one of another 6 or 7 small railways built in Lancashire from the late 1820’s and
it was typical of how many other early British railways, canals and gas and water
supply were built. Figure 2 gives a breakdown of initial investors in the railway.
Figure 2: Wigan Branch Railway: Investors
6According to Pollins (1954), this is a pattern repeated across the country in the finance of
tunnels and docks.
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As can be seen, shares in the railway were not purchased by a small number
of very wealthy distant individuals, but by a large number of relatively modest
local capitalists, manufacturers, tradesmen and professionals. The investors were
highly spatially concentrated around the location of the railway. This pattern of
spatially-concentration financial coalitions is observed in the Shea (2007) dataset
across different railways of the same period.
We also see most clearly with railways an element of learning in the emergence
of financial coalitions: Before a new form of transport has been tried and tested,
and before industrial hotspots have been identified, potential investors took more
convincing that buying shares was worthwhile (see Pollins, 1954). Following the
successful projection of early railways by local investors, so finance from a wider
sphere could be sought. Broadbridge (1955) finds similar results on the spatially
concentrated nature of early railway capital. That paper, and Ward (1974), also
points to the later emergence of regional centers of finance. Broadbridge tracks
a gradual movement in the second half of the nineteenth century away from local
subscription toward London. This did not happen just because the stock market
was there, but because conditions and capital requirements changed: His evidence
supports the “conventional view that railways were drawing their capital from ever-
widening sources in the early 1840’s, as compared with previous decades.” (ibid.,
p.206). Mitchell (1964) also documents this progress and specifically notes the pos-
itive spillovers from railway finance onto the later efficiency of the centralized stock
markets which provided finance for the wider economy: “Then again, it was the
railways which brought about the very rapid growth in provincial stock exchanges in
the 1840’s...” (ibid. p. 330). By popularising the limited liability form, by expand-
ing the range of individuals trading in shares, the emergence of the large railway
companies facilitated the emergence of a centralized stock market that began to
direct surplus savings into profitable industry.
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2.3 Local Investments, Regional Growth and Dynamic Fea-
tures
The most striking aspect of this history is that banks and central stock markets
were missing in the initial projection of each form of physical infrastructure.7 In
the early stages of development, obtaining finance for infrastructure projects from
central markets was dominated by raising it from scratch from among a relatively
modest local populace. Lesser information problems at the local level and the
spillovers onto the local economy meant that intermediation among local investors
was the preferred course.8
As infrastructures became larger, as industrial centers became more evident
and as industrial development itself began to require more sophisticated external
financing, the central financial systems evolved into markets more capable of eval-
uating distant (and, increasingly, larger) infrastructure projects. The examples of
spillovers from railway finance onto the late development of stock markets are spe-
cific to that case, but one might view the whole history of infrastructure finance
as a process of learning in financial technologies; the development of the efficient
financial structures that could then be tapped into by industry more widely. The
informational problems at the national level began to wane as the institutional
framework for centralized finance developed. Over time, central financial markets
became the dominant form of infrastructure – and industry – finance.
The pattern in provincial infrastructure development is mirrored by the provin-
cial nature of the industrial revolution. For Cottrell (1980, p.19), the “industrial
revolution... was essentially a process of regional growth.” Landes (1994) writes of
7Buchinsky and Polak (1993) find evidence that regional financial markets more generally were
detached from the London markets up until the end of the eighteenth century. The focus of this
paper is specifically on the finance of infrastructure projects but, clearly, the interactions between
these processes of learning at different points of the industrial takeoff and across different types
of industrial activity deserve further study.
8Work such as Petersen and Rajan (2002) has established the importance of distance to the
relationship between banks and those to whom they lend. Here, distance is important in the
emergence of the financial coalitions that predated the wider use of banking.
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the ‘precocity’ of regional specialization in England compared with Continental Eu-
rope. Recent work, such as O’Brien (2006), continues a growing literature on the
industrial revolution as a provincial phenomenon.9 Disjointed local and regional
infrastructures supported a local and regional industrial growth that itself com-
prized, on the national level, a disjointed patchwork of regional economies.10 As
the national economy emerged, so, in parallel, did both the national infrastructure
and the national financial markets to finance it and the rest of the economy.
Obviously this is a simplified version of the historical detail. The spatially
concentrated coalitions of investors in the early stages are observed consistently,
however, across different forms of infrastructure. The disjointedness of regional
development is also a clear conclusion of recent research. The implications of these
dynamic, disaggregated elements for industrial development and aggregate growth
are easiest spelled out in a simple theory of finance and growth that encapsulates
them.
3 A Model of Growth, Finance and Infrastruc-
ture
In the manner of the most influential simple models following King and Levine
(1993), we assume that financial intermediation is to some extent costly. Those
costs are intended to reflect the frictions associated with information asymmetries
between agents of different types.11 The structure of those costs, in the model of
this paper, is motivated by the historical record of infrastructure finance in the UK.
We assume that firms have no trouble raising capital for production. In con-
9Keller and Shiue (2008) and Atack et al. (2008) also relate regional market expansion with
regional infrastructural development.
10In the context of developed economies, the connection between local financial systems and
local economic performance is underlined in Dehajia and Lleras-Muney (2003) and Guiso et al.
(2004).
11A number of finance and growth models are surveyed in Levine (2005). A model of growth that
establishes microeconomic foundations for financial intermediation is Prescott and Boyd (1986).
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trast, infrastructure, an input to production, cannot be funded by individual firms
or individual agents alone. Agents who see the demand for infrastructure become
‘entrepreneurs’ and contract with intermediaries to organize capital funding. En-
trepreneurs then construct and lease infrastructure to firms. The efficiency of that
intermediation determines the costliness of raising capital for infrastructure. Firm
output is affected by the level of infrastructure that the firm is willing to pay for,
given the costs of raising capital for that infrastructure.
3.1 Productivity and Economic Integration
Assume that there are two regions in the economy. Funds can be raised at the
regional level, via regional financial intermediaries, or at the national level, using
national financial intermediaries. We make two assumptions: 1) A regional finan-
cial intermediary can only finance a regional infrastructure; and, 2) a firm can only
operate at the scale of the infrastructure that it employs. We are, of course, ab-
stracting greatly here in our conception of ‘regional’ and ‘national’ infrastructures.
Small pieces of infrastructure sometimes connected up to larger trunk lines which
mapped out a national network. The timing of such investments is not always
obvious, either. We simply wish to capture the idea that different investments in
infrastructure can cohere markets of different scale; and that early small-market
infrastructures fed into the emergence of later large-market infrastructures.
Part of the incentive for firms to operate at the national level arises from exten-
sive scale effects in technology, after Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and McDer-
mott (2002). Extensive scale also has a role in financial intermediary conditions.
The historical analysis above has indicated that both firms and investors can have
a preference for local funding in the early stages of growth. For reasons of trust,
knowledge of local market demand, ease of monitoring, etc., it is relatively less
costly to convince a local investor that a project is worth investing in when the
prospects of that project are hard to identify.
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There is also an intensive scale effect; we have seen that a transition from spa-
tially concentrated finance and markets to economy-wide finance and markets can
occur endogenously, because of complementarities between the local coalitions and
the later stock markets. We account for, in addition to the fixed information cost
effect of extensive scale, a learning effect in financial intermediation. This might be
a demonstration effect, or learning in the technology of financial intermediation. It
might also be that the return on national infrastructure projects are only sufficiently
high once regional projects have been developed. This learning process is similar
to the model in Lee (1996) where as the economy grows, intermediaries accumulate
information which in turn makes financial intermediation more efficient.
3.2 The Model
We have two regions, A and B, in the same closed economy. In each region there
is a unit mass of firms and a unit mass of consumer-agents. Agents can become
either intermediaries or entrepreneurs; entrepreneurs raise capital via intermediaries
in order to construct the infrastructure demanded by firms.12 One region cannot
trade capital with another without financial intermediation and infrastructure on
a national level. At a given point in time the economy operates as either i) non-
integrated regions with no national trade in capital; or, ii) an integrated national
economy with full factor mobility and equalized rates of return.
Agents are given an initial capital endowment and can allocate that between
production and funding infrastructure. Firms demand capital and infrastructure.
Agents can sell capital direct to firms but infrastructure is supplied via financial
intermediaries who ‘raise’ the funding from agents. The costliness of intermediation
drives a wedge between savings and investments that impacts upon what both firms
and agents receive. Consumption optimization by agents, combined with a specific
12Perfect competition will ensure every agent has identical consumption. We are not specific
about occupational choice in the model, except to rule out the possibility that agents become
entrepreneurs and intermediaries
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production function for firms, generates endogenous growth based on externalities
in the manner of Rebelo (1991).
3.2.1 Regional Growth
Two factors enter the production function: Capital, kt, and infrastructure, It.
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Assume both regions are specified identically and that initial values for capital and
infrastructure, k0 and I0, are the same in both regions. Consider region A, in which
firms produce a single good,
Y At = A(k
A
t )
α(IAt )
1−α, (1)
where 0 < α < 1. Each firm maximizes profits,
piAt = Y
A
t − rkAt − iIAt , (2)
subject to piA ≥ 0, and where each takes the rate of return on capital, r, and
infrastructure, i, as given,
r = α
Y At
kAt
; (3)
i = (1− α)Y
A
t
IAt
. (4)
There is a market for the construction of infrastructure. Agent-entrepreneurs
can recognize the demand for infrastructure by firms but cannot fund it themselves,
they must obtain the services of intermediaries to raise the necessary capital. In-
vestment in infrastructure is different because it requires the services of an inter-
mediary. The entrepreneurs’ incentive is the rent she can charge for firms’ use of
the infrastructure.
Suppose that there are no costs to becoming an entrepreneur. Where m is
13Infrastructure is not subject to congestion.
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the rate on capital supplied by the intermediary, MAt is the infrastructure capital
supplied by an intermediary in region A and It = f(.) is the production function
for infrastructure, each entrepreneur maximizes profits,
iIt −mMt ≥ 0. (5)
We specify the simplest form for infrastructure production, specifically f(Mt) = Mt,
so the marginal return from capital allocated to infrastructure is constant and
perfect competition implies i = m.
The financial intermediary raises capital from agents and sells it to entrepreneurs.
Any agent who sees the demand for financial intermediation can become an inter-
mediary. The profit to an agent from financial intermediation at the regional level
is,
FA = (1− ψ)mMAt − (1 + φ)sMAt , (6)
where s is the private return that agents obtain from selling infrastructure capital
to intermediaries.
Two costs are incurred by the intermediary. First, a cost φ > 0 of collecting
capital from agents reflects the costs of communicating the worthiness of investment
in terms of expected risk and return. We have seen from the historical analysis that
this cost can be significant. Second, a cost ψ > 0 of distributing that infrastructure
capital to entrepreneurs reflects the cost of evaluating and monitoring potential
entrepreneurs. For the purposes of this analysis, and following much the literature
(see Levine, 2005), we do not specify the sources of these costs analytically. We
simply take the view, following the historical analysis above, that these costs exist
and can be significant.
The market for intermediation is also perfectly competitive: Given a large num-
ber of firms, agents and entrepreneurs, and given no fixed costs to becoming an
intermediary, any profits from intermediation are competed away. From equation
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(6), with FA = 0, we have the following relationship between the rates of return
on infrastructure capital,
m =
(1 + φ)
(1− ψ)s. (7)
Equation (7) reflects the wedge between saving and investment, as in Pagano (1993):
The more efficient the intermediation, the lower are the costs of collecting and dis-
seminating finance, and the closer are the rates of return on saving and investment.
Substituting the demand for infrastructure, equation (4), into the production
function, and given i = m, we have,
Y At =
[
A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)s
)1−α] 1α
kAt , (8)
which, where s is constant, is a simple form of Ak production which we know will
generate endogenous growth.
To close the model we specify conditions of consumer optimisation. Infinitely-
lived consumers maximize their expected discounted income stream,
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(ct)dt, (9)
where we define instantaneous utility as have constant elasticity of substitution,
u(ct) =
c1−θt − 1
1− θ . (10)
Agents chooses how much capital to sell to firms, how much to sell to intermediaries
(taking s as given for the moment) and how much to consume given k˙t + ct =
(r − δ)kt + sMt where δ is the rate of capital depreciation.14
14Implicitly, we are assuming that the I/k ratio is constant, so infrastructure grows at the same
rate as capital.
18
The Euler equation in consumption is,
c˙At
cAt
=
1
θ
(r − δ − ρ), (11)
which is equal to the balanced growth rate of the economy, γ. From the production
function, equation (8), we can derive r,
r =
[
A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)s
)1−α] 1α
. (12)
If the return on providing infrastructure funding is greater than the return on
capital for production all finance will be sold to the intermediary. If the return to
agents from selling capital to intermediaries is less than the return on that sold to
firms, all capital goes to firms as capital. Competitive intermediation thus ensures
also that s = r and so, from equation (12),
s = r = A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (13)
As such, from the Euler equation and this expression for the interest rate we have
in both regions the growth rate,
γA = γB =
1
θ
[
A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)
)1−α
− δ − ρ
]
. (14)
3.2.2 National Growth
In the light of the historical evidence discussed above, we allow for the possibility
that there are significant scale-effects in the costs of financial intermediation. We
define the national intermediary conditions to be,
F∗t = 2(1− ψ∗)i∗Mt − 2(1 + φ∗)s∗Mt, (15)
19
where ψ∗ = Ψ+ 2ω
It
and φ∗ = Φ+ 2ν
It
, ω, ν ≥ 0. So the costliness of intermediation is
related to the level of infrastructure. The parameters Ψ and Φ are exogenous fixed
scale factors, that could reflect the institutional environment. At early stages of de-
velopment, or if fixed costs are always high, an intermediary incurs additional costs
to operate at the national level, and to maintain zero-profit requires a higher return
on infrastructure capital sold to entrepreneurs. The fixed cost premia, Ψ − ψ and
Φ− φ, reflect the difference in underlying efficiency of the regional cf. the national
intermediary given the institutional environment. The non-fixed costs, parameter-
ized by ω and ν, reflect the ‘learning’ costs of establishing an infrastructure in order
to operate an economy at the larger level. Proxying for the size of regional markets
by the level of local infrastructure demand, IAt = I
B
t =
1
2
It, we have that the cost
raising finance to build a national infrastructure is decreasing in the size of regional
markets. In the long-run, these costs are zero but, in the early stages of growth,
they may be a significant determinant of the scale of intermediation.
An extensive scale effect in productivity, motivated above, means that the the
coefficient of technological progress at a national level is higher than that at the
regional level. The national production function is thus,
Y ∗t = A¯k
α
t I
1−α
t , (16)
where A¯ > A. The incentive for agents to want to fund projects at a national
level is the higher productivity of their capital, tempered by the costs of funding
intermediation to facilitate that production. As in the case of the regions, we
can find an analogous expression for the rates of interest on capital in the case of
integration,
r∗ = A¯
(
(1− α)(1− ψ∗)
(1 + φ∗)
)1−α
. (17)
It should be clear that r∗ will not be constant so long as ν, ω > 0. We will still
obtain a balanced growth path in the long run, but we approach it from below as
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It →∞. The long-run growth rate of the national economy is,
γ∗LR =
1
θ
[
A¯
(
(1− α)(1−Ψ)
(1 + Φ)
)1−α
− δ − ρ
]
. (18)
The transition to this asymptotic growth rate follows,
γ∗SR =
1
θ
A¯((1− α)(1−Ψ− 2ωIt )
(1 + Φ + 2ν
It
)
)1−α
− δ − ρ
 . (19)
We will need to re-formulate this expression for any numerical simulation but, for
the moment, the transitional growth dynamics should be clear: The rate of growth
of consumption and infrastructure is related to the level of infrastructure. The rate
of change of economic growth is at first positive and reduces to zero as time goes
to infinity: For an integrated national economy, limt→∞ γ∗SR = γ
∗
LR.
This growth rate will only be realized if the regional economies integrate. The
rate of interest at the national level, equation (17), reflects the combination of
increased productivity and increased cost of integrating the two regional economies.
Integration thus takes place if r∗ > r, where r is the rate of interest in the regional
economies. This condition is satisfied where,
A¯
A
>
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
It
)
(1−Ψ− 2ω
It
)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (20)
Once this occurs, there is capital mobility and we have the national production
function of equation (16) and no separate regional output, i.e. no agent would prefer
to operate regionally when national output is possible. At the point where r∗ = r
the growth rate at the national level is equal to that at the level of the regions.
By equation (20), the feasibility of integrating is decreasing in both the relative
additional costs of intermediating at a national level and the ratio of coefficients of
technological progress. So the timing of and transition to national integration here
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is endogenous to the model.
3.2.3 Equilibria
There are three possible equilibria for the economy, dependent on both parame-
ter values and the initial demand for infrastructure, I0. We either have regional
separation, national integration, or a transition from the former to the latter.
The only thing that will prevent integration in the long-run are high fixed in-
formation costs relative to the productivity improvement, i.e. if,
A¯
A
≤
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ)
(1−Ψ)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (21)
So it is possible that in the presence of either a low effect of integration on produc-
tivity ( A¯
A
is close to unity) or persistent high premia of pooling and coordinating
savings over the larger economy (Φ and Ψ are significantly higher than φ and ψ)
then we can be caught in a low growth trap. As such, there is, in this case, room for
exogenous intervention to make integration feasible. There is not, however, room
for a ’big push’ story to reach a higher growth path.
A second equilibrium will occur where initial infrastructure supply, I0, is such
that we begin with an integrated economy in the first instance, if,
A¯
A
>
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
I0
)
(1−Ψ− 2ω
I0
)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (22)
In this case, either a high productivity increase from integration or low fixed in-
formation cost can mean that a low initial infrastructure supply and low learning
cost effects (low ν and ω) could create conditions such that the economy is always
integrated.
The intermediate case, where the economy begins in its non-integrated form
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and endogenously integrates when conditions become right. This requires,
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ)
(1−Ψ)(1 + φ)
)1−α
<
A¯
A
≤
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
I0
)
(1−Ψ− 2ω
I0
)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (23)
In time zero, scale costs mean that it is optimal for financial intermediaries operate
on a small scale, using local finance to fund the construction of a regional infras-
tructure. In this initial phase, growth is low. Over time, regional markets grow
and a local infrastructure is constructed to support local output. This also lessens
the cost of raising finance to build infrastructure and integrate at a national level.
At a critical value of local market size we have national integration and a smooth
take-off in growth, approaching γ∗ over time as the economy matures. We thus
have an acceleration in industrial output growth as determined by endogenously
improving conditions for financial intermediation. In this case there is room for ex-
ogenous action bring forward the take-off point. The critical value of infrastructure,
at which we integrate, is the positive root of,
(1−Ψ)(1+Φ)I2t +
[(
A¯
A
) 1
1−α (1 + φ)
(1− ψ)2ω(1−Ψ)− (1 + Φ)2ω − (1−Ψ)2ν
]
It−4ων = 0.
(24)
So there is a potential role for accelerating development by reducing the costs
of information problems, as in the non-integrated equilibrium, but also here an
institution can either bring forward or put back the point at which integration
occurs; we present such results numerically.
3.3 Numerical Implications
Consumption, capital and infrastructure all grow, in continuous time, at the rate
γ = max{γA, γ∗SR}. For the purposes of a numerical extension we need to consider
the growth rate of the economy in a discrete-time form, so γh = (xt − xt−h)/hxt−h
for all growth variables x in the economy where h is the length of each discrete
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time increment. In the limit as h → 0 we have that γh → γ. In the regional
economy, and in the long-run integrated economy, the growth rate is constant. The
transitional growth rate, equation (19), is dependent on the stock of infrastructure
at time t, however. We can re-write the transitional growth rate as,
It − It−h
hIt−h
=
1
θ
A¯((1− α)(1−Ψ− 2ωIt )
(1 + Φ + 2ν
It
)
)1−α
− δ − ρ
 . (25)
We can solve for It in terms of It−h and obtain a solution for the growth rate of the
economy that can be solved numerically. Let It = I(It−h) be the solution to,
(
1 + Φ +
2ν
It
){
A¯−1
[
ρ+ δ + θ
(
It − It−h
hIt−h
)]} 1
1−α
= (1− α)
(
1−Ψ− 2ω
It
)
.
(26)
Of course, we need to check first that, given a particular calibration, there is only
one finite and real solution to equation (26). Then we can write equation (19) as,
γ∗hSR =
1
θ
A¯((1− α)(1−Ψ− 2ωI(It−h))
(1 + Φ + 2νI(It−h))
)1−α
− δ − ρ
 . (27)
Table 1 gives a benchmark calibration with which we can demonstrate some of the
growth dynamics. Figure 3 plots the course of growth. This economy is one which
begins regionally separated and integrates as endogenous financial intermediation
costs drop over time. As can be seen, the rate of growth of the regional economy
is constant at around γA = 0.054. That of the integrated economy begins low and
climbs to a long-run rate of around γ∗ = 0.064. The thick black line indicates the
equilibrium growth rate at any point in time, with national integration occurring at
t = 23 and a smooth transition towards the long-run growth rate of the integrated
economy.
Takeoff in industrial growth is endogenous to the costliness of raising finance
for fixed-cost investments, such as physical transport infrastructure. Institutions
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Table 1: Baseline Calibration
initial capital k0 40
capital share α 2/3
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5
regional coefficient of technological progress A 0.5
national coefficient of technological progress A¯ 0.6
fixed cost parameter on regional intermediation ψ 0.25
fixed cost parameter on regional intermediation φ 0.25
fixed cost parameter on national intermediation Ψ 0.3
fixed cost parameter on national intermediation Φ 0.3
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ν 5
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ω 5
Figure 3: Example Growth Path
that affect the costs of such intermediation will, then, indirectly affect industrial
development, even though industrial finance is itself not directly constrained. We
can see this by exogenously varying the finance parameters; Figure 4 reports the
time period, t∗ of takeoff under the parameterization of Table 1 but separately
varying Ψ (panel a.) and ν (panel b.).
At the same time as increasing the time until takeoff, a higher Ψ can lower long-
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Figure 4: Takeoff and Financial Costs
run growth rate until the point where the long-run non-integrated equilibrium is
preferred to the national equilibrium even as t→∞; as Ψ goes approaches 0.55 in
the Figure, so the point of takeoff approaches infinity. Varying ν, however, does not
affect the long-run growth rate, so does determine whether the economy integrates,
only when. That is, increasing the learning costs, other things equal, delays the
point of integration and the speed with which we approach the long-run growth
rate. There are substantial gains to reducing fixed costs in intermediation, then,
when they are very large. The gains from reducing ν apply only once Ψ is relatively
low.
The effect of decreasing the cost parameter on regional intermediation is to de-
lay the point of integration. In a normal model of finance and growth, this might
have deleterious welfare consequences. In this model, however, lower regional inter-
mediation costs make the regional growth rates higher and, with national financial
costs constant, delays takeoff. When national takeoff does occur, it benefits from
the lower learning costs resulting from the additional scale achieved at the local
level. The spillover from regional intermediation to the initial rate of growth of a
later integrated economy can be significant. Figure 5 contrasts the simple effect
26
of increasing ψ on bringing forward the integration point (panel a.) against the
national rate of growth at that point of integration (panel b.).15
Figure 5: Regional Costs, Takeoff and Growth
In other words, a non-integrated financial system can be a preferred method
of obtaining high average growth. In a model with an institution that must allo-
cate resources to reducing either national or regional financial costs, the optimal
approach is not unambiguous. Institutions designed to delay the emergence of a
integrated financial system by encouraging regional solutions to financing problems
might be preferred to institutions aimed at directly increasing the efficiency of the
national financial sector.
We have concentrated on an environment in which both regions are identical but
we can think the implications of some types of asymmetry between regions in this
simple model.16 Where initial capital stocks are different but the cost parameters
are the same the regions will grow at the same rate while not integrated and then
integrate at point where the aggregate stock of infrastructure reaches the critical
level defined by equation (24). The integrated economy then grows at the rate
15These simulations assume that at t = 1, the economy is not integrated; the earliest point of
integration is t = 2.
16I thank an anonymous referee for prompting this discussion.
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defined by equation (19). Suppose instead that initial capital is identical, but that
region A that has a lower value for ψ or φ. In this case, region A, the region
with better financial conditions, determines a point of takeoff that will be later
than that which region B would prefer.17 There are historical examples in which
the pool of investors in a piece of infrastructure were purposefully restricted to
those who has close connections with the locality.18 This slightly counter-intuitive
theoretical implication has some merit, therefore.
Of course, we cannot generalize too far based on a specific study of one coun-
try. But the importance of spatially concentrated coalitions of infrastructure fi-
nanciers during the industrial revolution in the UK does suggest that the finance
and growth mechanism might not be best understood as a purely aggregate phe-
nomenon. Recognising this might allow us to reconcile the historical account of
the UK with contemporary empirical evidence on the relation between finance and
growth.
4 Finance and Growth in Context
A range of studies, starting with King and Levine (1993), Demetriades and Hussein
(1996), have established that there is a relationship between financial development
(principally measured as aggregate financial depth) and the long run level of eco-
nomic growth; in some studies a causal channel is identified running from finance
to growth.19 Levine et al. (2000) used panel data and identification strategies to
demonstrate a positive correlation, while industry- and firm-level estimates, such
17We are assuming that the national economy integrates only when it becomes mutually ben-
eficial. Imagine two levels of regional growth in Figure 3; the growth rate in region A would be
lower if it integrated at the point when region B preferred integration. The simple model we
present in this paper is not capable of considering more complex interactions that might occur in
the presence of such asymmetry.
18Ward (1974) notes that investments in some waterways were restricted to those local to the
project in order to limit the effects of speculative investments by those who had capital but little
knowledge of the specific projects.
19As Beck and de la Torre (2006, p.1) notes, the “causal link running from finance to growth
has been rather convincingly established.”
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as Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), also support the view that financial
depth is related to industrial growth. More recently, Brunt and Cannon (2009)
have provided microeconomic evidence for the connection between banking depth
and capital investment in the context of the industrial revolution in England.20
Arestis and Demetriades (1997) demonstrate how different countries can be
characterized by different relationships between finance and growth. As such, the
implications of our UK study for the finance-growth nexus more generally is some-
what limited. But the causal findings in studies following King and Levine (1993)
do stand in contrast to the historical consensus that, in the UK during the indus-
trial revolution, financial matters did not constrain the takeoff of industry. We have
argued, however, that the ability to form spatially concentrated financial coalitions
was an important factor in the development of physical infrastructure. National
banking and stock markets did not matter until later in the development process,
and may have benefited from spillovers resulting from the development of those
earlier financial structures. In the finance and growth literature, there has been rel-
atively less stress placed on how such dynamic, spatially disaggregated mechanisms
interact with economic growth during a period of industrial takeoff.
We know from the theory that positive transaction costs, asymmetric informa-
tion and uncertainty can connect steady state endogenous growth to the level of
financial sector inefficiencies.21 Where those inefficiencies can be related to the
design of prevailing institutions, our understandable inference is for policies to be
formed in order to encourage the development of efficient national banking systems,
or to maximize the size of the financial sector on aggregate.22
But the costliness of transacting, the degree of information asymmetry, and
20Empirical work on historical data, such as Rousseau (1998) and Rousseau and Sylla (2005),
has also found that financial depth is related to, and perhaps leads, economic growth. See Levine
(2005) and Beck (2008) for surveys.
21Levine (2005) surveys a number of theories that rationalize the links between finance, en-
trepreneurship and growth.
22See Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2008) for examples of the policy implications.
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so on, is different between different economic agents, depending at least in part
upon geographic distance. Understanding of this is not new in the banking and
finance literature.23 The marked sectoral and geographical distinctions observed
through the industrialising UK suggest that these frictions can indeed be at work
in the context of an economy experiencing a significant takeoff in growth. A fuller
understanding of the affects of policy on finance and growth might need to take
into account the interaction with such disaggregated and dynamic mechanisms in
addition to the the affects on aggregate financial development.
These findings also draw attention to the parts of the finance and growth lit-
erature which point toward a more complicated relationship between financial de-
velopment on economic growth. For example, Arestis et al. (2001) use time-series
data to show that stock market development is not uniformly a growth-promoter.
In particular, they find no causal relationship between the size of the stock market
and economic growth in the US, a country with an historically fragmented state
banking system. Additionally, Rioja and Valev (2004a,b) have found that the re-
lationship between financial development and growth can depend on the level of
economic development. Rousseau and Wachtel (2010) have shown that the finance
and growth connection appears to have largely disappeared in more recent data.
The additional complexity explored in this paper could go some way to explaining
why some countries exhibit a link between finance and growth whereas others do
not. These issues clearly deserve additional research.
5 Concluding Remarks
In thinking about the objective of policy in the context of finance and growth, there
is a temptation to emulate the highly specialized, interconnected and centralized fi-
nancial systems of contemporary developed economies. By looking at evidence from
23See, among others, Petersen and Rajan (2002), Dehajia and Lleras-Muney (2003) and Guiso
et al. (2004).
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UK history, we have been able to identify a greater complexity in the transmission
between finance and growth.
We have argued that economic growth and financial development can interact
in ways that an aggregative, static understanding omits. The understanding of con-
straints on finance then differs by consequence. The importance of non-centralized,
non-specialized intermediaries in the financial history of the UK suggest that policy
be framed to accommodate the emergence of potentially more efficient decentralized
solutions to financing problems.
There are implications particular to the regulation of infrastructure construc-
tion and finance. Institutions which impose detailed restrictions on the quality or
location of infrastructure, or which require that only highly qualified engineers be
involved might restrict the feasibility of locally organized, relatively less-specialized
solutions.24 While industrial finance might be relatively unconstrained, industrial
development is dampened because decentralized infrastructural finance is made
more costly.
The UK institutional environment through industrial revolution did necessitate
that the financial coalitions which fund infrastructures obtain assent. This imposed
significant costs on coalition formation but it also facilitated the coordination of in-
frastructures, provided a forum for resolution of local property disputes and helped
gradually to formalize a best practice in finance and construction. Such regula-
tion would seem to allow those entrepreneurs with the best information about local
economic conditions to have the greatest chance of efficient finance of their projects.
There are other, more general implications for financial regulation. The role of
the government in the early phase of industrialization would seem to be the support
of private enterprize by forming institutions that make it easier to write enforceable
contracts, cutting the costs of forming private financial arrangements so that the
24The case of France in the early industrial period is a good example of this case (see Smith,
1990).
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early financial structures can emerge endogenously. This has come out of both our
historical analysis and the theoretical model we constructed to match our stylized
facts. Similar messages come out of the work of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001).
There are a number of potential extensions to the simple model we have used
to capture the relation between infrastructure finance and growth. Exploring the
role of institutions in this set-up also seems interesting, both in terms of the mix of
public and private finance in infrastructure development and also in terms of the
pursuit of large-scale specialized financial systems that may not be appropriate to
the prevailing degree of under-development in the rest of an economy.
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